Some warrants are issued with a scheduled increase in their exercise price. This increase, referred to as a "step up" in exercise price, occurs after the warrant is issued but prior to its expiration. We examine the price behavior of warrants and common stock at the scheduled step up date. The evidence suggests that the market correctly anticipates this event, and that warrantholders exercise (actually, refrain from exercising) rationally. We also argue that a step up provision does not appear to be a widely useful characteristic of a warrant.
I. Introduction
Warrants are included in over one-fifth of U.S. initial public offerings (Schultz, 1993a) and in over one-third of Australian IPOs (How and Howe, 2001 ). Warrants are a particularly important source of financing for young, small, and risky firms, and may serve as a signal of firm quality (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1997) . In the United States, the terms of a warrant (e.g., its exercise price and the length of its life) are contained in a legal document called the Warrant Agreement. The existing literature examines several warrant terms. For example, Howe and Wei (1993) study warrant life extensions and report evidence consistent with a signaling effect associated with warrant extensions. Howe and Su (2001) investigate discretionary reductions in warrant exercise prices and conclude that the option to lower warrant exercise price is an efficient feature of the warrant contract.
The focus of this paper is warrants whose Warrant Agreements specify a step up in the exercise price. A step up is a scheduled increase in the exercise price and is fully disclosed in the Warrant Agreement. This fact is important for two reasons. First, a step up is not a surprise-alert warrant investors know it is coming. Second, unlike a warrant extension or the lowering of warrant exercise price, a step up does not involve managerial discretion. Instead, it is "in the cards" from the time the warrant is issued.
To our knowledge, no study has looked at step ups in warrant exercise prices. The questions addressed in our research are: (1) Does the market fully anticipate the step up? and (2) Do investors exercise (or not) their warrants in a rational manner? Thus, we provide unique evidence on the ever-controversial topics of market efficiency and investor rationality. This evidence is of particular interest given the findings of Schultz (1993b) , discussed below. We also provide evidence that suggests that a step up provision is not an effective way in which to force conversion (exercise) of the warrants. We conclude that a step up provision is, at best, a neutral mutation in the sense of Miller (1977) .
This research is important for several reasons. First, warrants are an important source of financing, especially for small firms, but the market reaction around a step up date has not been examined. We are able to assess the extent to which the financial markets actually anticipate an event that should be fully anticipated. Second, we also examine market efficiency by documenting the long-run performance of firms following the step up date. Third, we investigate whether warrant investors act in accordance with finance theory in exercising their warrants.
Most directly relevant to our research is Schultz (1993b) who examines conversionforcing calls of warrants. His focus in on the timing of warrant calls and he concludes that they are called optimally. He reports that the call announcement is associated with an average abnormal return of -3 percent, consistent with studies of calls of other convertible securities.
However, his study also provides evidence seemingly at odds with market efficiency. In the period from ten days before call completion until one day after, warrant-calling firms show a cumulative excess return of more than 7 percent. Because the completion date is known in advance (once the call is announced), these results are not expected in an efficient market. 1 Schultz describes the returns around warrants calls as "puzzling." His results are consistent with the notion that investors do not fully understand warrants. Alternatively, it may be that the types of firms that issue warrants are subject to misunderstanding or are owned by investors with significant behavioral biases. Whatever the explanation for Schultz's findings, they suggest that it is worthwhile to examine warrant step ups because step ups may be subject to the same misunderstandings or biases as calls of warrants.
The next section describes the testable hypotheses, and section III reviews the data and methodology. We report our findings in section IV and conclude in section V.
II. Testable Hypotheses
Two testable hypotheses focus on the common stock of firms with step up warrants. The first hypothesis examines the stock price reaction to the step up. Because the step up involves no surprise, there should be no stock price reaction.
H 1 : There is no abnormal stock price change on the step up date.
For the past ten years, the finance profession has been interested in the long-run performance of firms undergoing various events, and many studies report significant long-run abnormal returns. In keeping with this line of research, the second testable hypothesis is: H 2 : For the three years following a step up date, the firms' stock will provide a normal rate of return to investors.
Two additional hypotheses focus on the effects of a step up on the warrants. Because the step up in exercise price is not a surprise, the price of the warrant should not change on the date of the step up.
H 3 : There is no change in warrant price on the step up date.
Finance theory shows the conditions under which it would be logical to exercise the warrant the day before the step up in exercise price. The decision algorithm essentially asks, "Is the warrant worth more if I exercise it now at the old, lower exercise price or is it worth more at the new, higher exercise price, but with the full remaining life?" If warrant investors are paying attention, the warrants will all be exercised, or none will be exercised, depending on the answer to this question. However, in practice, some warrant investors may be ignorant of the step up.
Practitioners call these investors "sleeping warrantholders."
H 4 : At the step up date, either all of the warrants will have been exercised or none will have been exercised.
III. Data and Methods of Analysis
Using the Securities Data Company (SDC) New Issues database, we initially identified all initial and seasoned issues of warrants over the period 1991 to 1998. We then searched the firms' public financial statements for information about the presence of a step up provision. This process yielded 58 step up events with known dates.
Of the 58 firms, only 41 firms have data on the CRSP tape for the period around the step up date. We use these 41 events in our analysis of stock price behavior around the step up date.
Thirty nine of these events are associated with warrants for which warrant price and volume data available in the Daily Stock Price Record. We also used the Daily Stock Price Record to check whether the number of warrants outstanding changed following the step up date. As discussed below, only two of the 39 are conversion-forcing step ups, as evidenced by significant declines in the number of warrants outstanding. The 37 non-conversion-forcing step ups constitute our
To analyze stock price behavior around the step up date, we use standard event-study methodology and the Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) test statistic. The estimation period consists of days -120 to -10, where the step up date is day 0. We use unadjusted returns for the warrants, and compute a t-statistic using the cross-sectional standard error for each day.
We calculate warrant returns using closing prices for 36 of the 37 firms. One firm has bid-ask spread data (but not closing prices), and we use the spread midpoints to calculate its returns.
We also collect data on the trading volume in the warrants in order to assess whether investors alter their portfolios in the period prior to the step up. Portfolio adjustments would be consistent with a clientele effect, in which the existing warrantholders do not wish to hold warrants that are substantially out of the money. High trading volume in the pre-step up period would also be consistent with the (potentially mistaken) belief that the warrant price will fall on the step up date.
Ex ante, we need to distinguish between those step ups that induce warrant investors to exercise the warrants, and those that do not. On the day before the exercise price of a warrant steps up, warrant investors must decide whether or not to exercise the warrants. One benefit and one cost result from exercising a warrant at this time. The benefit is that the investor will be able to buy one share of stock at a lower exercise price than after the step up. The investor can capture a higher intrinsic value of the warrant. The cost is that exercising the warrant ends the warrant's life -the warrant can be exercised only once. If the investor exercises the option, he will have to give up the time (speculative) value of the warrant. In some cases, the benefit of exercise will exceed the cost (when the intrinsic value is greater than the remaining time value at the increased exercise price), and the warrants will be exercised. In other cases, the cost will exceed the benefit (when the remaining time value is greater than the intrinsic value), and the warrants will not be exercised. In practitioner terms, the warrant is "worth more alive than dead" in the latter case.
Ex post, 37 of 39 warrants in our sample fall into the second category. That is, it is not rational for warrantholders to exercise these warrants (indeed, they are all out of the money), and warrantholders do not exercise. In one remaining case, all of the warrants were exercised. In another case, approximately 95 percent of the warrants were exercised, suggesting the presence of a few "sleeping warrantholders." This observation suggests that not all warrantholders behave in strict accordance with finance theory, contrary to H 4 . Table 1 shows the chronological distribution of the 39 step up dates. Panel A shows that nearly one-half of the sample events (18, 46 percent) occur in 1995. Since the median time between the issuance of the warrant and the step up date is 2.2 years, these step ups are associated with warrants issued in the early 1990s. Panel B shows that a disproportionate number of step ups occur in January (8 of 39, 21 percent). Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics about the actual step ups. Because the data exhibit some skewness, we focus on the medians. The first row of the table shows that the stock price is about 32 percent lower than the old exercise price. That is, just before the step up, the warrants are clearly out of the money. The median dollar difference between the stock price and the old exercise price is $1.75 (row 5). The maximum value reported in the last column, -$0.63, indicates that all of the warrants are out of the money prior to the step up.
IV. Findings
As seen in the second row, the stock price is about 42 percent lower than the new exercise price, corresponding to a dollar value of $3.44 (row 6). Rows 3 and 4 of Table 2 report that the median percentage increase in warrant exercise price is 28 percent of the stock price and 20 percent of the old exercise price. The median dollar difference between the old and new exercise prices is $1.00.
We report the characteristics of the sample firms in Table 3 . The average market value of equity is $2,934 million, but this statistic is strongly influenced by the inclusion of Intel in the sample. The median market value of equity is about $15 million. The sample firms are typically small, which is characteristic of firms that issue warrants (How and Howe, 2001 ).
The second row of Table 3 contains statistics about the market-to-book ratios of the sample firms. These firms have a median market-to-book ratio of 1.91, comparable to the market-to-book ratios reported by Howe and Su (2001 , Table 3 ) in their study of discretionary reductions in warrant exercise prices. The relatively high market-to-book ratio of the sample firms suggests that they are growth firms, again consistent with the broader population of firms that issue warrants (Schultz, 1993a) .
Also as seen in Table 3 , the sample firms are young (median age of 3.25 years) and have little debt (the median long-term debt to total assets ratio is 6 percent). They exhibit poor operating performance as evidenced by the negative operating earnings per share reported in row 5. The sample firms typically invest about 1 percent of sales in research and development.
All of these findings are consistent with earlier studies of firms that issue warrants. Table 4 reports the average abnormal stock returns around the step up date. None of the 11 days in the event window exhibits a significant average abnormal return. The cumulative return over the 11 days is -0.09 percent. This evidence supports the notion that the market has fully anticipated the step up. Table 5 shows the average trading volume in the warrants as a percent of normal trading volume, where "normal" for each firm's warrants is the average trading volume on days -15 through -6. As the table shows, the period surrounding the step up is characterized by higher than normal trading volume. However, on no day is the volume significantly different from normal levels. Table 6 shows the average return on the warrants. The only significant return in the table, -14.48 percent, occurs on day 0, the day of the step up. This result lends the impression that the step up was a surprise to warrant investors.
However, a closer examination suggests that the negative return is likely to be attributable to bid-ask spread bounce. Bid-ask spread data are available for only one of the 37 warrants; on day 0, the bid price for this warrant was $0.0625 and the ask price was $0.1875. For this security, a transaction at the ask on the day before the step up, followed by a transaction at the bid on the day of the step up would result in a -67 percent return for day 0.
For the other 36 warrants, the Daily Stock Price Record reports the high/low range for each day, as well as the "closing price." (We used these closing prices to calculate returns for these firms.) Using day -5 data, we find that the average relative day range, which is computed as the ratio of the day range (high minus low) to the closing price, is 10.19 percent, with a median of 0 percent. These results suggest that the warrants are not frequently traded (median day range being zero), and that bid-ask spreads on the warrants are probably quite high (the average of nonzero relative day range is 20.92 percent on day -5). We conclude that the seemingly large negative return on day 0 in the warrants is the result of transactions on that day taking place at the bid price, likely arising from sales by warrantholders.
As a crude measure of long-run performance, we calculate the average three-year return for the stocks of the sample firms and the corresponding market return, as proxied by the CRSP equal-weighted index. The sample firms experience an average three-year return of 49.33
percent, and the market shows a 74.15 percent average three-year return. The difference in the averages is not statistically significant (t-statistic = 1.53). Unlike other events (e.g., secondary
offerings, Loughran and Ritter, 1995) , a step up is followed by a period of apparently normal returns.
V. Summary and Conclusions
We find that the step up date is associated with no discernible abnormal return in the common stock, relatively low trading volume in the warrant, and a negative return on the warrant that is likely attributable to bid-ask spread bounce. We interpret these results as suggesting that a step up is fully anticipated by the market. We also find that warrantholders exercise rationally, with the apparent exception of a few sleeping warrantholders in one case. Finally, the long-run performance of the firms following a step up is arguably normal. In short, the market and investors behave rationally.
The relatively small sample size suggests that a minority of Warrant Agreements contain a step up provision. In fact, a search of an on-line warrant database (www.stockwarrants.com) shows no warrants with step up provisions. We also note that the step up provision does not induce exercise in 37 of 39 cases. Indeed, of the 37 cases, 29 of them eventually expire out of the money. Overall, we interpret this evidence as suggesting that a step up provision is, at best, a "neutral mutation" (Miller, 1977) in the Warrant Agreement. At worst, a step up provision is a failed experiment in financial contracting, such as the GNMA CDR futures contract examined by Johnston and McConnell (1989) . Table 2 Descriptive statistics for step ups in exercise price (S -X old )/X old measures the moneyness of the warrants prior to the step ups in exercise price. S is the stock price two days prior to the day of the announcement day and X old is the old exercise price. (S -X new )/X new measures the moneyness of the warrants after the step ups in exercise price. X new is the new exercise price. (X old -X new )/X old measures the percent increase in exercise price. Table 3 Descriptive statistics-step-up firms Means, medians, and sample sizes for characteristics of firms that announce a step up in the exercise price of warrants. Market value of equity is the price per share two days prior to the announcement multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. Market-to-book ratio is the market value of equity plus the book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets. Age is the number of years from listing until the announcement. Long-term debt and total assets are book values, measured at the end of the year prior to the announcement. Operating earnings per share is net income before extraordinary items divided by shares outstanding. R&D is research and development expenditures. R&D and sales are measured at the end of the year prior to the announcement. Note: the large average market value of equity is due to the inclusion of Intel, which contributes more than $2,900 million to the average statistic. Table 4 Returns of stocks around the step-up event days
Median
For each event day, the table reports the average abnormal return in percent of common stocks of the firms whose warrants' exercise prices were scheduled to step up on day 0. Test of significance use the Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) t-statistic. We estimate abnormal returns using the market model with parameters estimated from day -120 to day -10. The CRSP Nasdaq index is the market proxy. Table 5 Changes in warrant trading volume around the step-up event days
For each event day, the table reports the average percent changes in warrant trading volume from its pre-event averages. We use day -15 to day -6 as the pre-event period. We compute t-statistics by using the cross-sectional standard error for each day. Table 6 Returns of warrants around the step-up event days
For each event day, the table reports the average return in percent of the warrants whose exercise prices were scheduled to step up on day 0. We compute returns from warrant closing prices. We compute t-statistics by using the cross-sectional standard error for each day. 
